It is hard to overstate how magically promising satellite Internet service is. Satellites provide vital online connectivity for millions of people who live in underdeveloped nations or remote areas, something that terrestrial infrastructure has so far been unable to do. Satellite broadband is the driving force behind a wide range of connectivity-dependent technologies in commercial sectors like maritime and aviation.
The disruptive potential of truly global connectivity is expanding as the next generation of satellite Internet takes shape. To enjoy these advantages, it is necessary to make sure that these services are dependable and secure. In our new research, we looked more closely at contemporary satellite broadband use with the intention of spotting historical Beveiligingsbedrijf security errors before they become a legacy for the future.
It is widely believed that nation-state actors and signals intelligence (SIGINT) organizations are able to eavesdrop on satellite signals. In this study, we aimed to broaden this threat model and take an individual, low-resource attacker into account. We intercepted radio signals from two significant maritime Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) internet service operators using basic home television equipment that cost less than USD 400.
The poor quality of our radio recordings as a result of employing consumer-grade equipment was one of the main problems. Customers would often install sophisticated VSAT systems costing tens of thousands of dollars or more aboard their vessels in the marine sector. Simple television equipment had trouble keeping up with these networks’ intricate modulation methods. This has historically been seen as a mitigating aspect to the eavesdropping threat because it was believed that only highly skilled and motivated attackers would be able to obtain such equipment.
Hackers, on the other hand, do not need 100 % dependability as Internet users do. In fact, a single packet may include important information that an attacker may use. We created a forensic program to retrieve partial IP headers and packets from otherwise severely degraded VSAT signal recordings in response to this.
This meant ignoring complex edge-cases and focusing on “low-hanging fruit” that could be quickly retrieved from the captures, both of which were standards-violating assumptions about the underlying protocols. This enabled us to turn corrupt signal recordings that were useless for study into useful files for examination with well-known network tools like Wireshark. Between 50 and 70 % of the packets that arrived at our dish could be partially reconstructed using our technique, yielding gigabytes of valuable network traffic data.
Investigating these recordings further, we discovered that neither marine VSAT service provider provided over-the-air encryption. In other words, encryption was completely left up to the user. Although a large number of consumers used HTTPS and related protocols, thousands did not. Some of the biggest shipping, cargo, and cruise lines in the world, as well as smaller yachts, fishing boats, and ferry firms, were among the organizations that leaked private information over these streams.
The security and privacy of maritime boats were directly affected by this. We discovered attack points via which eavesdroppers could gain access to private data, such as the contents of the cargo or crew members’ and passengers’ passport numbers. Likewise, some vessels had sensitive credentials that would have permitted the upload of fraudulently altered nautical charts or malware aimed at vital operating technologies (OT).
It is tempting to blame these problems on user or Internet service provider (ISP) errors for employing unsafe protocols. However, we discovered that there are non-trivial technological obstacles to strong encryption in these networks throughout the course of appropriately revealing these vulnerabilities.
We discovered that significant performance deterioration prevented individual consumers from using conventional end-to-end VPN technologies. Due to speed of light restrictions, connections for VSAT services in Geostationary Orbit (GEO) have exceptionally high latency (up to 700ms round-trip time). Behind the scenes, ISPs reduce this latency by optimizing the time-consuming TCP three-way handshake procedure. However, if the customer tunnels their TCP connections over a VPN, it is impossible to do these optimizations. Customers are consequently compelled to use fragmented application-layer encryption or endure slow network performance.
Latency-sensitive satellite encryption solutions have been developed recently; these tools are often aimed toward satellite ISPs. Our research, however, indicates that the market has not yet adopted these technologies. It may be just as crucial to building technological encryption protocols for these networks as it is to rebalance incentives in favor of security through law or business strategy.
Beyond this particular case study, it is evident that experimental research is required to refute security hypotheses based on the price of equipment or the determination of an attacker. It is crucial to understand, though, that security does not exist in a vacuum. Finding problems is a crucial first step, but there are many more to come. Making beveiligers security research useful requires an understanding of the fundamental economic and technical choices that result in insecure systems.It is very important to make the right choices. Choose IEC Telecom to be your reliable partner in providing the best solutions when it comes to maritime VSAT security, and you can rest assured that you will be getting the one-stop solution that would work for all your needs.
